norm violations and honor --- spurned honor

"Performing acceptable behaviors in honor cultures increases social image while any act of violating damages it."

"Performing acceptable behaviors in honor cultures increases social image while any act of violating honor values damages it." from Ugur-Sakalli (2013). Honor” and “Honor Violence against Women” in Honor Cultures: Social Psychological Explanations. Turkish Psychological Articles.

NOT ONLY VIOLATING HONOR VALUES, HONOUR IS NOT SOMETHING MADE UP OF SPECIFIC VALUES, BUT IT IS A CULTURAL SYSTEM THAT EFFECTS MANY INDIVIDUALS' PSYCHOLOGY (AFFECT, BEHAVIOR, COGNITION) COLLECTIVELY.

see this paper, Daly & Wilson (1989) Homicide and Cultural Evolution.

honour beliefs as an ideology

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02134748.2014.918822?journalCode=rrps20#.VRBolNKsW-c

Abstract

The purpose of this work is to analyse how some ideological variables (ambivalent sexism, culture of honour, and right-wing authoritarianism) affect rape myths acceptance (RMA). Two hundred and fourteen university students (83 men and 131 women), mean age 20.39 years old, participated. The results show that there is a high correlation between RMA and hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, culture of honour, and right-wing authoritarianism. Hostile sexism and right-wing authoritarianism predict RMA in both male and female samples. Benevolent sexism predicts RMA in the female sample. In addition, in the male sample right-wing authoritarianism interacts with hostile sexism to predict RMA, while in the female sample right-wing authoritarianism interacts with benevolent sexism to predict RMA. These results show the close relationship existing between certain ideological variables and RMA.

VERY IMPORTANT GENDER NON-CONFORMATY MEASURES!

Development of this measure was motivated by the recognition that systemic discrimination is often rooted in unfair treatment of an individual based on instantaneous visual cues without any prior knowledge of that individual’s background or self-identity. Jones and colleagues examined socially assigned race and health status in the BRFSS and found that being perceived as White was linked with better health outcomes in individuals who self-identified as a racial/ethnic minority (Jones et al. 2008). Given that perceived gender nonconformity, like socially assigned race, is an external cue used to judge an individual, it follows that socially assigned gender expression could be similarly linked to health disparities. The effects of discrimination and victimization based on socially assigned gender nonconformity can be severe and long-lasting. Verbal abuse towards children perceived as gender nonconforming can begin by age 6 years, if not earlier, while studies from the U.S. and the United Kingdom have found that victims report enduring psychological distress, suicidality, posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, and physical health symptoms such as dizziness, headaches, or vomiting (Carbone 2008; D’Augelli et al. 2006; Fitzpatrick et al. 2005; Gruber and Fineran 2008; Hughes et al. 2007; Rivers 2004; Rosario et al. 2009). While studies with adults (Lippa 2002; Skidmore et al. 2006) and youth (Blashill and Powlishta 2009; D’Augelli et al. 2005) have found lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) populations to be more gender nonconforming than heterosexuals, harassment and discrimination targeting nonconforming gender expression are not restricted to people with a minority sexual orientation. Heterosexuals may also be targets for bullying and verbal or physical abuse based on their gender expression (Horn 2007). Gender expression has been associated with acceptance by parents, peers, and society independent of sexual orientation, especially after middle school when standards of gender conforming behavior decrease in flexibility (Alfieri and Ruble 1996; Ma’Ayan 2003). In one study in which U.S. high school students rated the acceptability of hypothetical peers displaying a range of sexual orientations and gendered behaviors, gender nonconforming students were ranked as less acceptable than conforming individuals regardless of sexual orientation (Horn 2007). Elevated rates of victimization in LGB populations may be attributable in part to higher levels of gender nonconforming behavior compared to heterosexuals (Corliss et al. 2002; Rivers and Cowie 2006; Saewyc et al. 2006), although there may be important differences in the ways that sexual minority



Wylie, S. A., Corliss, H. L., Boulanger, V., Prokop, L. A., & Austin, S. B. (2010). Socially assigned gender nonconformity: A brief measure for use in surveillance and investigation of health disparities. Sex roles, 63(3-4), 264-276.

Gay Stereotypes: The Use of Sexual Orientation as a Cue for Gender-Related Attributes

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11199-009-9684-7/fulltext.html

"In addition to these two major hypotheses, analyses will also test for participant gender effects. However, given previous research showing that gay stereotypes (unlike attitudes toward homosexuality) do not vary as a function of participant gender, significant effects are not anticipated.

Finally, supplemental exploratory analyses will be conducted to examine whether the tendency to view homosexual targets as gender atypical is more pronounced for gay males vs. lesbians."

Liben, L. S., & Bigler, R. S. (2002). The developmental course of gender differentiation: Conceptualizing, measuring, and evaluating constructs and pathways. Monographs of the Society for Research in Childhood Development, 67(2), 1–147.

Measure Social Image OR Reputation OR Concern for Reputation

Some ciritical evaluations of "Rodriguez-Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer (2002) The role of honour concerns in emotional reactions to offences"

Empirical research on the determinants of emotional experiences in reaction to offences in honour cultures has, to date, mainly focused on the characteristics of offence situations that lead to emotion, and particularly to anger, in honour cultures. This research has documented that offences that: (a) take place in public; (b) question the reputation of one’s female relatives in terms of sexual shame; or (c) threaten masculinity lead to intense anger in honour cultures (see e.g., Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965; Stewart, 1994). These types of offence threaten core honour values, such as the importance of protecting one’s reputation in public settings, thereby eliciting intense emotions in honour cultures. In other words, whether or not an offence has implications for the status of one’s honour plays an important role in determining how members of honour cultures react emotionally.


"In other words, it can be argued that emotional reactions to honour-threatening offences should be mediated by honour concerns, that is, by the extent to which one is concerned with maintaining honour by conforming to prescriptions of the honour code." ---> if honour is a culture and it is to do with social and moral reputation (just like religion, or capitalism), its conforming role should  go beyond the prescriptions of the honour code itself, but should be shaping all kinds of behaviors that are related to reputation. (See below that if honour values and honour are to do with reputation, social interdependence and family honour - importance and maintenance of these values can be implicated virtually to all public behavior)

Previous cross-cultural studies on social values in these countries have established that honour and honour values (e.g., reputation, social interdependence, family honour) are more important in Spain than in The Netherlands (Fischer, Manstead, & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999, study 1; Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, in press).

There are two emotions that are especially associated with the loss of honour, according to the literature on honour: anger and shame. Anger has been studied in particular in relation to threats to male honour (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, 1997; Cohen et al., 1996, 1998; Murphy, 1983; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Stewart, 1994). Honour cultures promote a view of manhood in which expressions of toughness, strength, and status in public behaviour are even more desirable than is the case in individualistic cultures (Gilmore, 1990).


GOOD:
In contrast to men’s emotional reactions to offences in honour cultures, women’s emotional reactions have been less systematically studied. In the lit- erature on honour and offences women are usually portrayed as the instigators of angry reactions in men in offence situations, and as socialisation agents of such angry reactions in children (see e.g., Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Previous research on honour and emotions has shown, nevertheless, that offences can also lead to female anger in honour cultures: When asked to recall autobiographical experiences of anger, both female and male Spanish participants reported that being offended by an intimate other was a common elicitor of anger (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000). There are grounds, therefore, for expecting that offences would also lead to angry feelings on the part of women in honour cultures.

Feeling shame when social respect is withdrawn, as in the case of an offence, signals one’s attachment to the honour code and is moreover consistent with a self-definition in terms of ‘‘having a sense of shame’’. In addition, such an emotional reaction should reinforce one’s identity as a person who cares for his/ her honour. Because reputation is emphasised for both sexes in honour cultures, experiencing shame in reaction to an offence should be elicited in both women and men in these cultures.

Revisions in my ideas for my PhD dissertation - Discuss with Ayse

It was very interesting to read all the comments, and to see converging criticism from four different people! They are saying that these studies do not add much to advancing theory on culture of honour and its link to sexism, and that it shouldn't be published in JPSP as it is. So this automatically made me think if my PhD work would contribute to the advancement of theory, and what I should do in order to publish in good journals (not just JPSP).

I liked this comment. 

By creating an index, the authors treat honor at the cultural level as a continuous variable. Nations all value honor to a greater or less degree. This seems different from the way anthropologists have talked about cultures of honor. There are societies in which the social and economic world, and familial and gendered relations are structured around the honor code, and there are other cultures that have supplanted the honor code with liberalism. So, does it make sense to talk about cultures that are, say, moderate on the honor index? I think it's worth at least discussing the theoretical implications of considering honor as a construct that can vary in strength, as opposed to an organizing code that is present or absent in a culture.

I'm glad some reviewers think this way :)

In my first study, I started with looking at how people who endorse honour strongly would judge people who appear to be gender non-confirming (masculine women and feminine men) more harshly (an outcome of honour showing how honour may punish gender nonconfirming people), and then I can look at this from the other way around, so I can break people's honour, and see if they try to regain their honour through behaving in more gender-confirming  ways (this would provide evidence for how honour works in making men keep their masculine images, and women their feminine images). 

Next, I may go beyond gender norms and look at other social norms (e.g., high-status people appearing/behaving like low-status people. e.g., once one of my father's patients told my dad: "Doktor bey o elindeki eski telefonla napiyorsun? Doktor adamin antenli nokya telefonu mu olurmus, bir iphone alsana" demis. Hastalarim yuzunden telefonu upgrade etmem gerekti demisti babam. Baska bir reklam ajansi sahibi arkadasim Izmir'de parka bisikletle cikilamiyor biliyorsun Toronto'daki gibi rahat bir ortam yok demisti, cunku musterilerini onu o sekilde sort ve bisikletle gorurlerse ona is vermezlermis.). These high-status people appearing like low-status would probably be judged as less honourable, less competent people in an honour culture like Turkey than in non-honour culture. So honour would work as an organizing code which enforces people to confirm to the image and appearance norms expected of them.

Then, I may take it further and look at moral rules and conventions.

Research on moral psychology and philosophy differentiates moral rules (you shouldn't hit your friend) from conventions (you shouldn't make noise after 11pm), and they say that these are two forms of social regulation. In Turkey for instance, if people break moral rules, they are strongly condemned, others shame the violator of the moral rule. When it comes to conventional rules, which are broken all the time, and rule of law doesn't work properly to punish the violators, right, and because of the lack of laws as social regulators, people are encouraged to break the conventional rules. However, others may still shame the violators of conventional rules too, and they do. Maybe to a different extent.

In western Europe for instance, violations of even certain moral norms are punished by law. 

This also fits to the evidence which suggests that honour cultures have evolved in places where there are weak law-enforcement (conventions are like rule of law). In these cultures, moral rules might have.

And perhaps it is more meaningful to study the role of honour codes as a social regulator from a violations perspective, because it is easier to measure the effects of honour (emotional outcomes: shame, anger, etc.).

http://www.education.com/reference/article/morality-social-convention/

A post on System justification theory

http://freethoughtblogs.com/crommunist/2011/10/20/why-are-you-hitting-yourself-an-intro-to-system-justification-theory/

So I’m not sure what your impression of the way I run things around here is, but let me tell you that my info gathering process isincredibly haphazard. Every morning I browse through the various news sites I read, and pull out articles I find interesting. I do the same at lunch from the blogs I follow. Some items come from Facebook or G+ friends, others get sent to me by readers. Every Saturday morning(ish) I pull out the file of the week’s acquisitions and whittle down to the handful of stories I can make hay with in a week’s worth of posts. Some weeks it’s light, other weeks it’s overflowing and I have to delete stuff I really like (since by the time I get to it, it’ll be comically out of date).

Once in a very rare while, I stumble across something that is a veritable goldmine of bloggable content – something that not only ties together a number of separate ideas I’ve had in the past, but helps me re-orient my thinking along lines that open up new avenues and new questions to explore. Such a goldmine is this paper by Jost, Banaji and Nosek:

Most theories in social and political psychology stress self-interest, intergroup conflict, ethnocentrism, homophily, ingroup bias, outgroup antipathy, dominance, and resistance. System justification theory is influenced by these perspectives—including social identity and social dominance theories—but it departs from them in several respects. Advocates of system justification theory argue that (a) there is a general ideological motive to justify the existing social order, (b) this motive is at least partially responsible for the internalization of inferiority among members of disadvantaged groups, (c) it is observed most readily at an implicit, nonconscious level of awareness and (d) paradoxically, it is sometimes strongest among those who are most harmed by the status quo.

This article reviews and integrates 10 years of research on 20 hypotheses derived from a system justification perspective, focusing on the phenomenon of implicit outgroup favoritism among members of disadvantaged groups (including African Americans, the elderly, and gays/lesbians) and its relation to political ideology (especially liberalism-conservatism)

This, for me, is even better than bacon-flavoured porn. It’s the “holy grail” of theoretical frameworks when it comes to understanding an important phenomenon in sociology and race/gender/status issues. It’s important, and I will be referring back to it frequently, so I am going to take my time and pull out the main ideas proposed in the text. It’s 38 pages long, so this is definitely going to take more than one post to give it the attention it deserves.

The topic under scrutiny is the seemingly counter-intuitive behaviour we often see from oppressed (the paper uses the term ‘low-status’) groups, wherein they buy into the propaganda about their oppressors. Why, for example, do some black children identify a white doll as the “nice” one in studies of preference? Why do many women engage in some of the same anti-feminist misogyny that you’d expect to be exclusively male? Why do people with low incomes vote for Republicans, or support policies that work directly to their own economic disadvantage? It’s so counter-intuitive as to be almost comical – why would people act in ways that are directly contrary to their self-interest?

Put the way a childhood bully might, “why are you hitting yourself?”

The authors posit that this seeming contradiction only occurs because our models of human behaviour fail to account for all forces at work. They contrast their approach with the widely-accepted group justification theory models. Basically, the idea behind group justification theory is that people exhibit in-group biases to favour those who are more like themselves. We draw a circle around a group of people based on a characteristic of our choosing (for example, skin colour or nationality) and say “this is us”. We exhibit pro-social biases toward members of our own group, while expressing antipathy toward those outside the circle. This certainly makes sense, and I’ve talked about it before.

The problem with this view, say the authors, is that it does not always match the observed reality. They use an example of American slavery – relationships between master and slave were certainly not pleasant, but it made infinitely more sense for the slave-owners to have an ostensibly friendly relationship with their slaves, and vice versa. This matches, to a certain extent, the types of relationships observed with “house slaves” before Emancipation, and domestic workers up to this day. There is a serious power imbalance, but not open antipathy. Indeed, we often see abuses against domestic workers going unreported not out of fear, but out of admiration and a desire not to “hurt” the abuser (this also matches other kinds of relationships with skewed power dynamics).

The authors explain this discrepancy in the following way:

…hierarchy is maintained not only through mechanisms of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation exercised by members of dominant groups, but also by the complicity of members of subordinated groups, many of whom perpetuate inequality through mechanisms such as outgroup favoritism.

Or, to translate from science-speak: power imbalances are perpetuated with the permission and participation of those on the lower end of the divide, with those at the top favouring themselves, and those at the bottom agreeing.

The psychological mechanism of this action is explained (quite brilliantly, I think) according to three competing psychological motives: ego motive, group motive, and system justification. The ego motive – the desire for self-esteem and acceptance – can be thought of in terms of “I like me”. Group motive refers to a desire to see those in your in-group in a positive light – “I like us”. System justification motive, however, refers to our attitudes towards the general state of affairs – “I like things the way they are”. These three motives are in competition with each other, and can be made more or less salient (cognitively available and subjectively important) depending on the circumstances.

The authors of the paper point out that members of a group on the low side of a power divide are less likely to push for a change in the system if ego or group justification needs are not being met. Put another way, even those for whom the system sucks will tend to side with the status quo unless their desire for greater self-esteem (either individually or as a group) overcomes their inherent belief that the current social order is as it should be. If self-esteem can be maintained alongside the system’s integrity, people will find ways of rationalizing their position – whether they’re at the top or the bottom.

Like I said, this is a complex and well-evidenced theory – too long to fully explore in one post. I will keep coming back to this paper, because it really does explain a lot.

Blind patriotism in Turkey: “Whatever my country does, I support

https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/bulent-gokay/race-and-racism-in-modern-turkey

According to a recent survey, “blind patriotism” appears to be dominant among Turkish citizens, even in the most urban parts of western Turkey. “Blind patriotism”- the act of allegiance to a cause without clear thought, a completely one-sided loyal commitment - here refers to reactions that may be described as, “Whatever my country does, I support.” Sixty-nine percent of those surveyed said there is nothing to be ashamed of in the country's history. All this explains why a TV series and a cinema film based on the series, “The Valley of the Wolves”, that glorifies gun-toting nationalists who mow down their mainly Kurdish enemies, is by far the highest rating TV series and one of the highest box office returns in the history of Turkish TV and cinema. Even Turkey's parliamentary speaker, Bulent Arinc, described it as "absolutely magnificent". ***

Leung & Cohen (2011) honor works as a short-term irrationality and abhors cost-benefit calculations - Especially in Politics

Discriminaiton against Syrian refugees in Turkey

1 millian 6 hundred refugees live in Turkey out of which 70% of them live in big cities.

https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/dogus-simsek/antisyrian-racism-in-turkey

Syrian refugees are not the only victims of racism in Turkey. In Turkey’s history, Kurds, Armenians, non-Muslims, gypsies, blacks, Arabs and many other minorities are subjected to racism. Many Turkish citizens do not accept that there is racism in Turkey as they state that they are proud of their hospitality towards foreigners.

However, racism is visible everywhere, in public space, private space, in all corners of the world. Discriminatory discourses have prominently been attributed to the Turkish process of modernization, the building of its nation-state and the formation of Turkish national identity. These discourses have been spread by the media, state and institutions in all cases resulting in the marginalisation of Syrian refugees.

Many Turkish citizens, especially those among Turkey's poor, believe that Syrian refugees have been looked after with the taxes they pay; they steal their jobs; they are burglars, beggars, criminals; they are culturally different - not modern; they create social tension, etc. The xenophobic and racist discourses have become legitimized through such phrases. Forms of racism and xenophobia are closely interlinked with the economic situation, as in Europe. 

Mediated hatred

The content of racism is elided with that of difference. Public discourses against Syrian refugees are based on a ‘them’ and ‘us’ mentality. When people identify themselves as a member of a particular group, they do not feel comfortable with others. The public's concerns about Syrian refugees are to do with culture, values and sustainability. The mainstream media, some column writers, and the opposition, use and amplify these concerns about Syrian refugees living in the cities. The racism of mainstream media is visible in many news contexts. For instance, Anadolu Agency (Anadolu Ajansi) refers to ‘Syrians' as unable 'to adap to an urban lifestyle in Turkey’ in the news; Syrian refugees are seen as criminals, problem makers in many item daily in mainstream papers.

Apart from being victims of racism, Syrian refugees in Turkey are also used as a politial football by politicians. The opposition party has criticized the foreign policy of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government on Syria as being too sectarian and not supporting the ‘open door’ policy towards Syrian refugees put forward by the opposition party politicians.

Some column writers who endorse the opposition party also wrote that ‘we look after Syrians, give them money; offer them jobs. While Turkish soldiers defend their nation, they sit back and do nothing’. Such racist discourses do not only target Syrian refugees, but also use them as a policy-making tool. With such discourses, racism has slowly been shown to infect almost all of society. The public, some column writers and politicians blame Syrian refugees, rather than denouncing the state, as the cause of unemployment, crime, social tension, rising rent prices; these opportunists are using the vulnerability of Syrian refugees for their own interests, and the interests of the capitalist classes.

Syrian refugees in Turkey are seen as criminals, beggars, burglars, exploiters, prostitutes, as tools for politics, but not as individuals. Turkey’s state, media, and civil society have to work seriously to create an environment for Syrian refugees to live respectably, as well as to develop measures and an environment that prevent the targeting of Syrian refugees.

Doganay, U. , Kenes, H. (2014). 'The Discourse of Discrimination and Hatred against Syrian Refugees: The Turkish Media in Question!'. World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, International Science Index, Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(6), 812.

Abstract:

Syrians that had to leave their country due to the on-going civil war since March 2011 take refuge in countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey. Turkey’s “open door” policy had impact on Syrian’s preference of Turkey as refugees. In correlation with the increase in their number and extended period of their stay, criminalizing news on Syrian refugees began to circulate more often. Some striking claims concerning Syrians in the press as follows: “Syrians have given Turkish citizenship”, “The government granted salaries to Syrian refugees”, “Syrians benefit greater rights and social aids than the Turkish citizens”, “Syrian will vote in local and general elections”, “Syrians create turmoil in the towns they are inhabited”, “Syrians do not pay the shopkeepers” Syrian men harass women in the towns”, Syrians as cheap labor narrow down the labor market”. Additionally various oppositional political groups began to characterize the refugee camps as “terrorist camps”. Both the news and oppositions’ attitude contributed to building in negative prejudices and engrafting a language of hatred and enmity against refugees or asylum seekers. The criminalization of Syrian civilians, most of which are women and children, through the negative news on them enforce us to study the role of the media in the ignorance of rights and liberties of the refugees and in the increase of racism and discrimination against them. Thus, it is crucial for this study to disclose the media’s coverage of Syrian refugees whom the political elites prefer to call “guests”. In other words, this study aims to display how Syrian refugees are framed and presented by the press in Turkey. The study will then focus on chosen news from the national press to show how hatred and racism are embedded in the discourse of the news. For this purpose, chosen news and columns according to the breaking events between March 2011 and June 2014 will be examined through discourse analysis.

http://www.mintpressnews.com/MyMPN/syrian-refugees-live-second-class-citizens-turkey/

I recently visited Istanbul, a Turkish city filled with Syrian refugees. Some old, some young but each with the same horror story of leaving behind dead friends and family in Syria. Their journeys to Istanbul are filled with difficulty and danger. Once arrived in Istanbul, most were not welcomed with open arms. Turkish people have a sense of pride towards their culture and history and many feel that the influx of refugees will change their identity. Many stores in Turkey refuse to speak to you in anything but Turkish for fear of their language being replaced with Arabic. Lots of Landlords refuse to lease apartments to Syrian refugees and most employers will discriminate against Syrians or not hire them at all.

One of the Syrian refugees I met was a young man in his mid-20s, married with two children of his own and supporting four other relatives. He worked 10-12 hour days, six days a week with no benefits for roughly $300 a month. This does not even provide the basic needs for his family, but they survive. His wage is less than a quarter of what his Turkish peers would make for the same job. When I spoke with him he told me he felt lucky and blessed to at least have some sort of income.

The children in the streets of Istanbul are plenty. All wander attempting to sell simple items such as napkins, pencils or candy. Some cannot afford to buy those items to sell so they just ask for anything from any passerby. They wear the expressions of children robber of childhood; their faces tell an excruciating story without uttering a word.

On a day strolling through the city, I stopped and talked to young girl selling napkins. She told me how she came home in Syria to find her family dead from a barrel bomb that destroyed her home. Along with her grandparents she was forced out of her country. They made their way to Istanbul where they live as second-class citizens. She kept a smile on her face while talking to me and even offered some insight to the political world in general and why she was forced to be a refugee. Her experiences had matured her beyond her years, more than what any child her age should face.

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/security/2014/05/turkey-syrians-discrimination-refugees.html#

https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/bulent-gokay/race-and-racism-in-modern-turkey

sexist definition of "musait" and contributions of TDK to a patriarchial culture

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-language-body-raises-eyebrows-with-sexist-definition-of-available.aspx?PageID=238&NID=79463&NewsCatID=341

from Sexual Love and Western Morality: A Philosophical Anthology

"Every society has an image of the masculine and the feminine and the roles that men and women are to play when they are acting in a manner distinctive to their sexual natures. It is through these images and the particular ways in which these roles are acted out that the physical act, itself describable in wholly physiological terms, is dependent upon some playing out of some socially and psychologically defined roles as preliminary to its initiation." - Introduction, page xi, D.P.Verence - Sexual Love and Western Morality: A Philosophical Anthology